U.S.-Thai Military Alliance Is At A Crossroads

In late May, the Royal Thai Air Force said the U.S. had denied its request for Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II fighters, an outcome that unfolded as China looms ever larger in Asia’s regional security picture—and in Thailand’s orbit.

• American arms exports face challenges in the Indo-Pacific region
• Despite burgeoning Sino-Thai ties, the U.S. military is making quiet progress

The U.S. said it rejected the request because of production constraints—saying it could not deliver the F-35 to new buyers for at least 10 years based on current production rates and orders—but also because Thailand lacks readiness to receive the F-35. Thailand would need to improve everything from the quality of its airfields and air base security to maintenance and pilot capabilities, according to the U.S.

That was just part of the story. “From a U.S. government standpoint,  [Thailand’s request for the F-35] was never seriously considered,” Trey Meeks, managing principal at consultancy Asia Group in Washington and a former colonel in the U.S. Air Force, tells Aviation Week. “They do not have a good record with tech security.”

These events illustrate the challenges the U.S. must manage in balancing security alliances in the Indo-Pacific region with arms sales as it faces the most precarious geopolitical environment since the Cold War.

As a U.S. treaty ally, Thailand understandably would seek the F-35, the most advanced fighter jet of the world’s premier military power. In the Indo-Pacific, the U.S.’ other treaty allies, save the Philippines, all have the F-35.

That said, “the F-35 is perhaps overkill for Thailand’s defense needs,” says Drew Thompson, a visiting senior research fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore (NUS) and a former Pentagon official. “For a continental country, it is pretty secure in its geography.”

The U.S. has closely guarded the F-35’s technical security, holding back the United Arab Emirate’s purchase of the advanced fighter jet because of concerns about a Chinese telecommunications network. Turkey was an original partner in the development of the Lockheed Martin fighter, but its deal was scuttled after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan purchased the Russian S-400 air defense system. The U.S. has reportedly offered to sell Thailand its Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 70 and Boeing F-15EX Eagle II fighters instead of the F-35, although the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) may opt instead for another fleet of Saab Gripen fighters.

Meeks suggests that Thailand show the U.S. it can appropriately safeguard the F-16’s active, electronically scanned array radar technology. “Then you can have an actual honest conversation about the F-35,” he says.

In addition to specific technology-related risks, the U.S. is concerned about the broader deepening security relationship between Thailand and China. In the past decade, the Thai and Chinese militaries have begun training together regularly, and the countries signed 10 major arms deals between 2014 and 2019, among them a $1.3 billion package including three diesel-electric submarines and 48 battle tanks comprising Thailand’s largest arms purchase to date.

“China didn’t have as much to offer in the 1990s when it was still busy ripping off Soviet tech and reverse engineering,” Thompson says. “But as China’s defense industry has moved up the quality ladder and the innovation ladder, it has a better menu to offer its customers.”

Although Chinese defense equipment has some shortcomings compared to equipment produced in the U.S., “when you factor in affordability and potential financial shenanigans that may appeal to a client, then yes, China is a good option,” Thompson says.

The Thai military continues to have close ties with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), from which it has acquired surface-to-air missiles, ships and submarines. The RTAF and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) have conducted a joint exercise known as Falcon Strike five times since 2015 during which Thailand deployed Saab Gripen Cs against advanced Chinese Chengdu J-10s and Shaanxi KJ-500 airborne early warning aircraft. In 2022, Thailand also used German-made Dassault/Dornier Alpha Jet light attack aircraft.

Under an agreement between the Thai and U.S. air forces, the RTAF’s F-16 and F-5 fighters are barred from participating in a joint exercise with China, presumably to prevent the PLAAF from gathering technical insights about those aircraft.

Thailand and China kicked off the 2023 Falcon Strike exercise on July 10 at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base. The exercise included Chinese fighter jets, bombers, airborne early warning aircraft and ground-to-air missile installations and is intended to “strengthen military cooperation between the two countries and maintain regional peace and stability,” Chinese state news agency Xinhua said.

Boripat Ratchaneepun, an officer with the RTAF directorate of operations, said the drill is intended to improve “mutual trust and friendship” between the RTAF and PLA, Xinhua reported.

Meanwhile, Thailand and China are slated to hold joint army exercises Aug. 16-Sept. 2 and joint naval exercises Sept. 3-10, according to The Bangkok Post.

“Thailand is broadly diversifying its security policy,” says Benjamin Zawacki, a Bangkok-based expert on Southeast Asian security and author of Thailand: Shifting Ground Between the U.S. and a Rising China. While “the Thais would still prefer American weaponry,” they can obtain more from China at a lower price and receive delivery much more quickly, he notes.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a professor of international relations and political science at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, traces the deepening Sino-Thai military ties to changes in Thailand’s political system that began nearly a decade ago. “The Thai military had to seek support from China as Thai politics turned more authoritarian after the May 2014 coup, including arms procurement and high-level visits,” he tells Aviation Week.

The Obama administration responded strongly to the coup, suspending roughly $4.7 million in military aid, canceling small-scale military exercises and halting an officer exchange program. In addition, then-Secretary of State John Kerry warned: “This act will have negative implications for the U.S.-Thai relationship, especially for our relationship with the Thai military.”

“The U.S. has not always treated Thailand as a respected ally,” NUS’ Thompson says.

For its part, the Pentagon has not sought to distance itself from the Thai military. U.S. military commanders value their access to the Royal Thai Navy Airfield at U-Tapao on the Gulf of Thailand, which has one of Asia’s longest runways. During the Vietnam War, U-Tapao served as a staging center for U.S. Boeing B-52 bombing runs into Cambodia and Vietnam.

In exchange for its support of the U.S. in Vietnam, Thailand received $1.1 billion in economic and military aid and an additional $530 million from the U.S. Agency for International Development, according to research by Richard Ruth, a professor at the U.S. Naval Academy. Foreign investment poured in, and the tourism industry boomed in the decades after the war ended, helping Thailand develop an upper-middle-income economy by 2011.

Given this history, it is unsurprising that Thailand has high expectations of its treaty alliance with the U.S. and would feel justified in requesting the F-35, Zawacki says. Yet he acknowledges that the treaty-ally paradigm creates unrealistic expectations on both sides. While Washington’s other Indo-Pacific treaty allies generally see China in a similar light to the U.S., in Thailand’s case, “it is like trying to fit a square peg in a round hole,” he says.

At the same time, the U.S.-Thai alliance does appear to have staying power. Thailand has remained a major buyer of U.S. arms exports, with more than $3 billion in active Foreign Military Sales, according to the U.S. State Department. In fiscal 2019-21, Washington also authorized the permanent export of more than $605.9 million in defense articles to Bangkok via Direct Commercial Sales.

Among what the State Department describes as “significant implemented sales” are the Boeing AH-6i Little Bird, Sikorsky UH-60M Black Hawk and Eurocopter (now Airbus Helicopters) UH-72A Lakota helicopters; F-16A/B Block 15 aircraft Midlife Upgrades; and RGM-84L Harpoon Block II and Evolved SeaSparrow missiles.

A source with knowledge of U.S.-Thai ties tells Aviation Week that bilateral military exchanges have increased 180% since 2018.

“The military-military component of the Thai-U.S. alliance remains robust,” Chulalongkorn University’s Pongsudhirak notes. Both the U.S. and China have boosted their exchanges with Thailand’s military. “But the increase with China attracts more attention because it’s new and because of U.S.-China competition,” he adds.

In light of the ruling junta’s major setback in the May election, Pongsudhirak says: “I anticipate that Thailand’s new post-election and relatively more democratic government will reorient and recalibrate to aim for a more balanced approach, as Bangkok will not need China’s support as much because Western democracies will view the poll and post-poll government favorably.”